The WHO declares War on Wine
The World Health Organisation has declared war on wine. In its latest salvo, the WHO demands that governments implement automatic 50 per cent price increases on alcoholic beverages by 2035, with inflation-linked escalation mechanisms that would permanently ratchet costs upward. Yet, behind the veneer of public health concern lies a troubling economic reality: this policy would hit working families hardest whilst leaving wealthier consumers largely unaffected.
The WHO's diagnosis is simple. Alcohol and sugary drinks are becoming cheaper, it claims, due to weak tax systems that fail to keep pace with inflation. Its prescription is equally straightforward: steep, sustained tax increases coupled with automatic escalation clauses that remove democratic oversight from fiscal policy. What the organisation conveniently omits is who pays the price.
Academic research exposes the flaw in this approach. Alcohol excise taxes are regressive, extracting a larger percentage of income from those least able to afford it. Studies demonstrate that only low-income drinkers pay more for pure alcohol after tax increases, whilst wealthier consumers adjust their purchasing patterns to maintain consumption. When the WHO advocates for higher alcohol duties, it is effectively proposing a tax on the poor disguised as health policy.
Consider the WHO's targeting of wine, which remains untaxed in 25 countries, predominantly in Europe. France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain have historically maintained minimal or zero excise duties, recognising wine as integral to their culinary heritage. Are we to believe that southern European countries, with their Mediterranean diet patterns and favourable health outcomes, have simply got this wrong for generations?
Britain has already embraced alcohol taxation with vigour. The 2023 alcohol duty reform introduced a strength-based system making the UK one of Europe's most aggressive taxers of alcohol. A litre of 40 per cent vodka now carries £13 to £14 in duty.
Yet the WHO now demands automatic inflation-linked increases that would ratchet prices ever upward. When price levels fall after inflationary spikes, will alcohol taxes come down? Of course not. The WHO envisions a ratchet that only turns one way.
This is particularly troubling given current economic realities. Working families have endured years of cost-of-living pressures. Now the WHO proposes to add another burden to household budgets, framing it as health promotion whilst ignoring the basic unfairness of hitting those with the least disposable income hardest.
The evidence on tax effectiveness deserves scrutiny. Whilst heavy taxation may discourage light drinkers, research indicates the price elasticity for heavy-drinking adults approaches zero in many studies, meaning heavy drinkers are largely unresponsive to price increases. The tax falls on all consumers, including moderate social drinkers. This indiscriminate approach violates basic principles of fair taxation.
The WHO's focus on wine is particularly misguided. Analysis of European taxation shows that countries like France levy minimal excise duty (€0.03 per bottle) whilst maintaining sophisticated wine cultures characterised by moderation. By contrast, high-tax regimes have not demonstrably produced healthier drinking patterns. The Nordic countries with punitive alcohol taxes still grapple with binge drinking cultures.
The fundamental problem with health taxes tied to inflation is that they embed a permanent upward spiral. The WHO recommends that taxes be adjusted regularly, as if this were sensible housekeeping. But there is nothing neutral about automatic escalation clauses. They transfer fiscal decisions away from democratic scrutiny, creating a system where prices rise mechanically without politicians having to justify increases.
When around half of EU member states maintain zero or minimal wine excise taxes, this represents appropriate national discretion. These countries understand that wine, when consumed responsibly as part of a balanced diet, occupies a different cultural niche than products designed primarily for intoxication.
Public health advocates argue that lower-income individuals are more price-responsive and therefore benefit from tax-induced consumption reductions. This paternalistic logic treats adults as incapable of making their own choices. Should policy be designed to make modest pleasures significantly more expensive on the theory that working people cannot be trusted to drink responsibly?
Britain's experience with its reformed duty structure offers lessons. The Institute of Alcohol Studies analysis found that structural reforms effectively targeted heavy purchasers without increasing economic inequalities. This careful calibration stands in sharp contrast to the WHO's blunt instrument of across-the-board price hikes.
The wine industry faces particular challenges under inflation-linked taxation. Wine alcohol content varies naturally with vintage conditions, typically by around 2 per cent from year to year. Producers cannot simply adjust recipes to hit specific alcohol targets the way soft drink manufacturers reformulate to avoid sugar taxes. Automatic duty increases combined with strength-based taxation create administrative nightmares for an industry characterised by small producers and independent merchants.
European wine producers may believe their political influence renders them immune. France levies a token €0.03 per bottle on wine. Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal maintain zero or minimal rates. Powerful wine lobbies have successfully weakened France's Loi Evin advertising restrictions since 1991, and recently mobilised thousands to protest minimum pricing proposals.
Beware the Treaty Trap
This confidence may prove misplaced. The WHO possesses constitutional authority under Article 19 to develop binding international conventions. Its Framework Convention on Tobacco Control became one of the most rapidly ratified treaties in UN history, with 182 countries now bound by its provisions. Public health advocates have been calling for a similar Framework Convention on Alcohol Control since 2006.
Such treaties fundamentally alter the political landscape. Once ratified, they create ongoing obligations and shift authority to international bodies. The tobacco convention established a Conference of Parties that adopts guidelines and protocols, with countries under sustained pressure to comply. The framework convention approach is designed precisely to circumvent domestic lobbies by elevating policy-making to the international level.
Wine-producing countries assuming their domestic power insulates them from international pressure are ignoring history. The tobacco convention succeeded despite fierce industry opposition. The WHO's recent European report specifically criticises the EU's 1992 directive permitting zero minimum taxes on wine. Once a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control enters force, the ratchet begins turning. Countries face reputational costs for non-compliance. Governments find it politically easier to implement unpopular measures under cover of treaty obligations.
What has changed is not just the policy process, but where permission is now formed. Positions that attract broad public support, cultural legitimacy, and moral credibility travel more easily into law. Those that don’t are constrained long before any formal decision is taken, regardless of the evidence behind them.
The consequence is that familiar strategies are no longer enough. When permission is formed across a broad public arena, waiting to respond once proposals surface is structurally weak. By then, positions have already been judged as reasonable or unreasonable, responsible or irresponsible. Evidence still matters, but it rarely decides the outcome on its own
France's wine producers may win today's parliamentary battles, but they are fighting yesterday's war. The real threat comes not from their own government but from the international architecture being constructed around them.
The WHO would have us believe this is about saving lives yet moderate consumption is compatible with healthy lifestyles, and wine is embedded in food cultures worldwide.
The WHO's inability to distinguish between moderate social drinking and problem consumption reflects troubling absolutism. By insisting that no level of alcohol consumption is safe, the organisation abandons nuance and denies the reality of Mediterranean dietary patterns.
What the UK needs is thoughtful policy which balances public health concerns against economic fairness, cultural values, and individual choice. Inflation-linked automatic increases would be a step backward, removing democratic accountability whilst imposing regressive burdens.
Countries maintaining zero or minimal wine duties have not descended into chaos. They have preserved important traditions whilst maintaining sophisticated, moderate drinking cultures. The WHO's grand plan for 50 per cent price increases represents public health overreach: regressive, economically illiterate, and dismissive of ordinary people's reality. The UK, and Europe, should reject this prescription and pursue balanced policies that respect both public health and economic justice.
This isn't the end of the argument. Read our article about 'Why the WHO’s ‘No Safe Limit’ Narrative is the New Tobacco Playbook'.
